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Our main objective is to study the effect of institutional directors on firm performance, 
distinguishing directors according to whether they maintain business relationships (pressure-
sensitive) or not (pressure-resistant). Our results show that in weak regulatory and low 
investor protection environments, institutional directors have a negative impact on corporate 
performance. Our evidence does not show that these two kinds of institutional directors 
behave differently. However, when we study the effect of board composition before and 
during the current financial crisis, the findings show that directors with no business 
relationships (pressure-resistant) contributed towards reducing corporate performance during 
the crisis.  
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Boards of directors can play a significant role in controlling agency problems. From an 
agency perspective, the ability of a board to monitor its managers depends on the directors’ 
degree of independence (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996). However, in EU countries, 
independent directors do not appear to be particularly efficient, and directors representing 
institutional investors sometimes play a more important role as board members (Pucheta-
Martínez and García-Meca, 2014). In this context, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon 
environment, the control exercised by institutional investors who are also board members 
enables them to take part in the internal decision-making process of a firm (e.g., Hoshi et al., 
1993; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). 
The presence of board members representing institutional investors is increasing 
throughout all OECD countries, and institutions are becoming more dominant in corporate 
governance, even in civil-law countries (Jara-Bertín et al., 2012). Prior research has not yet 
examined how directors representing institutional shareholders affect corporate performance 
in a low investor protection environment with a high presence of this type of board members, 
such as Spain. Therefore, our paper studies, firstly, how institutional directors affect company 
performance and, secondly, the influence on firm value of directors appointed by different 
institutional investors; specifically, and following  López-Iturriaga et al. (2014), we 
distinguish between directors representing banks, savings banks and insurance companies and 
directors representing investment, mutual and pension funds. In accordance with previous 
literature (Almazán et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2007), we differentiate 
between institutional investors who maintain business ties with the companies, defined as 
pressure-sensitive, and those who do not, defined as pressure-resistant. 
Therefore, this paper has two main purposes. Firstly, we study the relationship 
between institutional directors and firm performance. Secondly, we distinguish between those 
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directors that represent investors who maintain commercial links with the company where 
they serve as board members and those who do not, and we explore how they affect firm 
value. We focus on Spain due to its high number of this type of director on its boards, with 
institutional investors simultaneously being both core shareholders and highly represented 
directors.  
This paper makes several different contributions. First, we show the effects of 
directors representing institutional investors on value creation in a way that is not possible to 
capture in those countries where institutional investors are only shareholders. Due to its 
institutional investors being simultaneously core shareholders and highly represented 
directors, Spain affords an exceptional occasion to explore how institutional directors are 
associated with corporate performance creation. Secondly, our estimates note that the negative 
effect of resistant institutional investors on firm performance was higher during the crisis, 
suggesting that the short horizon of resistant institutional investors led managers to adopt 
adverse short-term strategies affecting performance, especially during turbulent market 
periods. 
These findings have implications for numerous parties, such as institutional investors, 
regulators, potential new board members and other corporate governance reform proponents, 
who frequently examine board characteristics to assess the effectiveness of boards in value 
creation policies by providing important policy implications for the design of corporate 
boards.  
The findings show that institutional directors are negatively associated with firm 
value. Furthermore, our results also find that there are no differences between directors 
representing banks, saving banks and insurance companies, and directors representing 
investment, mutual and pension funds. The results also suggest that an emphasis on board 
independence alone may not be enough to enhance value creation since it does not impact on 
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firm value. Instead, focusing on foreign directors may be a more fruitful way to increase 
performance, especially in countries with high ownership concentration. Our findings support 
this assertion. In addition, when we analyse the effect of institutional and foreign directors 
before and during the crisis, the findings show that only foreign directors affect firm value 
positively during both periods, while directors with no business relationships influence 
corporate performance negatively during the crisis.  
In the next section, we describe the institutional context where the research was 
conducted. In the third section, we provide the hypotheses development. The fourth section 
offers the sample, variables and methodology. The fifth section analyses the results and, 
finally, the sixth section draws the most important conclusions.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Spanish companies are characterized by a one-tier board system, high ownership 
concentration, low independence, and a high proportion of directors representing institutional 
investors on boards (Heidrick and Struggles, 2011).  
In Spain, important institutions such as the state, large banks and recently privatized 
companies have become controlling shareholders and play important roles when solving 
important corporate governance issues (Crespí et al., 2004). These controlling shareholders 
usually sit on boards in order to represent the interests of institutional investors, playing an 
important role as controlling shareholders, members of their boards and creditors (e.g. banks). 
However, in the Anglo-Saxon context, capital markets play an important role as a funding 
source of companies, and directors representing institutional investors are not so important. 
Therefore, most of the institutional investors on Spanish boards belong to banks and also to 
investment funds. In addition, previous research conducted in Spain (García-Meca and 
Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Lorca et al., 2011; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014) reports 
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that the effective monitoring of management is exercised by institutional board membership 
and not by independent directors, finding inconclusive results for the supervisory role of 
independent directors in comparison to institutional investors.  
In order to increase the transparency of the stock markets and to protect the rights of 
shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, Spain carried out legal and institutional 
changes. Several Corporate Governance Codes were set in order to recommend compliance 
with corporate governance regulations. For example, the Olivencia Report (1998) established 
firm value for shareholders as the principal priority. In 2003, the Law on Transparency of 
Listed Firms (LTLF) Report and the Aldama Report (2003) were published. The Aldama 
Report, which replaced the Olivencia Report (1998), defined that all board members had to 
pursue the firm's sustainability in the long run. Finally, in 2006, the Unified Code of 
Corporate Governance (CUBG, 2006) Report, or Conthe Code, was published, which unified 
the Olivencia and Aldama Reports. The purpose of the CUBG (2006) was to improve 
business management and return transparency to the Spanish system. Three kinds of directors 
were distinguished by the CUGB (2006): executive, independent and institutional. While 
executive directors are insiders and are directly involved in the management of the firm, both 
independent and institutional directors are considered as outsiders with different agendas and 
incentives for controlling managers. The CUBG (2006) recommended that Spanish boards be 
made up mainly of outsiders. In other words, the presence of insiders had to be kept to the 
minimum possible level in order to address information and communications needs. The 
proportion of independent directors recommended was at least a third of the total number of 







The board of directors plays an important role in overseeing and monitoring the 
company, and its composition is crucial for reducing agency problems and aligning the 
motivations between principal and agent.  
Previous literature analysing how institutional directors affect corporate value is 
heterogeneous. Some papers such as Kochhar and David (1996), Li and Shackell (2001) and 
Song et al. (2016), note that these directors are mainly concerned about maximizing the 
profits of their reference shareholders, noting a positive role of these directors. In this regard, 
some other papers suggest that institutional directors help managers to implement their 
strategies and facilitate coordination among stakeholders (Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012; 
Pugliese et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, other authors (Varma, 2001) argue that institutional directors are passive 
and claim that their monitoring role is ineffectivedue to conflicts of interest with the company 
(Black, 1992; Kochhar and David, 1996), their relatively short-sighted goals (institutional 
investors focus on short-term corporate performance) (Bushee, 1998; Coffee, 1991), the free-
rider problem (Admati et al, 1994), or because they simply do not have the necessary skills 
(Taylor, 1990). Consistent with these views, Pound (1988) posits that institutional investors 
may align themselves with incumbent managers due to strategic alliances or previously 
existing relationships and that this leads to a decline in corporate performance. Hence, based 
on the above heterogeneous arguments, we posit that institutional directors may influence 
corporate performance either negative or positively. Thus, we pose the following unsigned 
hypothesis: 




According to differences in preferences and incentives to control corporate decisions, 
we can find different behaviours in directors representing institutional investors. For instance, 
some institutional investors prefer short-term trading profits, whereas others prefer to monitor 
companies and exert influence on managers (Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). Wang (2014) supports 
the view that institutional directors are not a homogeneous group, categorising them 
according to three aspects: investment strategy, investment duration and the block-holding 
level. The author finds that these three factors, individually and collectively, drive the 
heterogeneity of institutional investors in mitigating accruals management and are also their 
incentives when monitoring managers with regard to accruals management. Koh (2007) also 
classifies institutional investors into two categories, according to their investment horizon - 
long-term or transient institutional investors - in order to analyse their impact on the earnings 
management strategies of firms. His research demonstrates that long-term institutional 
investors alleviate aggressive earnings management, while transient institutional directors  do 
not. Accordingly, institutional shareholders have different attitudes towards CEO 
compensation, Corporate Social Responsibility, profitability, earnings management, R&D 
investment decisions and spending, anti-takeover amendments and remuneration policy, 
among others (López-Iturriaga et al., 2014; Ullah and Jamali, 2010). According to their 
business objectives, we can distinguish between pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant 
institutional directors (Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Kochhar and David, 1996; Pound, 1988).  
Mutual and investment funds, pension funds and venture capital firms are considered 
in the literature as pressure-resistant institutional investors. They are freer than other 
shareholders due to their only maintaining an investment relationship, and not a business 
relationship, with the companies in which they invest (Wahba and Elsayed, 2014). In this 
vein, authors such as Sahu et al. (2014) and Wahba and Elsayed (2014) reported that firms 
with a higher corporate value have more pressure-resistant than pressure-sensitive directors 
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serving ontheir boards. However, pressure-resistant directors may align with managers (Van 
Nuys, 1993) and support their decisions, such as to decrease firm performance, because these 
directors are representing investors who might have business ties with the firm in the future 
(for instance, if a firm becomes interested in  choosing a mutual or pension fund provider for 
their employees). This thesis is supported by Woidthe (2002), who found a negative 
relationship between public pension funds and firm value. Thus, the above views suggest that 
pressure-resistant institutional directors may affect corporate performance either positively or 
negatively.  
On the other hand, pressure-sensitive institutional directors have higher monitoring 
costs due to their interests in protecting their relationships with the firm. Therefore, when 
banks are creditors and shareholders in companies, controlling and strategic coalitions may 
arise, creating groups in order to extract private benefits. They may also go along with 
management decisions in order to avoid jeopardising their business relationships with the 
firm, and vote in favour of management recommendations (Brickley et al., 1988), creating 
expropriating alliances with controlling shareholders (Pinto, 2006). Some prior research finds 
a negative association between sensitive institutional board members and firm performance. 
For instance, Bhattacharya and Graham (2007) and Sahu et al. (2014), noted that pressure-
sensitive institutional investors on boards in Finland and India are negatively associated with 
firm performance. Similar conclusions were found by Khanna and Palepu (2000), Mohanty 
(2002), Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) and Wahba and Elsayed (2014), who demonstrate a negative 
association between bank shareholding and corporate performance.  
In accordance with the above arguments, we propose the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Firm performance is positively or negatively affected by pressure-
resistant institutional directors  
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Hypothesis 2b: Firm performance is negatively affected by pressure-sensitive 
institutional directors 
 
SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY  
Sample 
Our sample is composed of 144 non-financial companies listed on the Spanish Stock 
Exchange from 2004 to 2010. Financial entities have been excluded from the sample because 
they comply with specific accounting rules and because the role of their boards is limited, 
given the strict control that financial regulatory bodies exert over them. The SABI database 
was used to collect company market value and financial data, while the corporate governance 
report disclosed annually by listed companies was used to gather corporate governance data. 
An unbalanced panel data set of 600 firm-year observations was built. According to 
Arellano (2003), the findings provided by unbalanced panel data sets can be as accurate as 
those provided by balanced panel data sets.  
 
Variables  
We measure performance by using Tobin’s Q ratio (Vafaei et al., 2015). Computations of 
Tobin’s Q ratio seen in the literature today often use Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) 
approximation, which equals [market value of firm’s common stock + liquidating value of 
preferred stock + book value of debt] divided by the total assets (Jiang et al., 2015). 
According to Chung and Pruitt (1994), this way of measuring Tobin’s Q ratio can be 
considered an accurate indicator in line with the correct measurement of Tobin’s Q ratio 
proposed by Lindenberg and Stephen (1981) from a theoretical perspective. Prior research 
focused on corporate governance effectiveness, and particularly board effectiveness, was 
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based on these indicators as a proxy for corporate value (e.g. Carter et al., 2010; Hart et al., 
2015; Jackling and Johl, 2009). 	
Previous research analysing the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance was based on accounting measures (Return on Equity, Return on Assets and 
Return on Sales) and market measures (Tobin’s Q ratio), with Tobin’s Q ratio being the most 
frequently used. Financial accounting measures have often been criticised because: (1) they 
are subject to manipulation; (2) assets might be undervalued; or (3) alterations might be 
created (Mackey and Barney, 2013; Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca, 2007).  
Contrary to accounting indicators, Tobin’s Q ratio, a market indicator of company 
value, is based on the whole value that the market has assigned to the company, being mainly 
free from associations with asset assessments, present activities or even the company’s past 
profitability. This assessment underlines what future earnings the company expects and, 
therefore, it can be considered as a valuable measure for representing present strategies and 
plans. Under the strong market assumption, any positive impacts of boards would be readily 
apparent to market participants and so reflected in the market capitalization of the firm (Fama, 
1998). In our sensitive analysis, we will also use the market to book ratio, already used as a 
measure of performance by Adjaoud et al (2007) and de Andrés and Vallelado (2008). 
We also employ several independent variables. The first independent variable used is 
denoted by INST and shows how many institutional directors, who represent institutional 
investors, sit on boards. In line with López-Iturriaga et al. (2014), we also consider the 
presence of pressure-sensitive directors (i.e. financial entities and insurance firms) and 
pressure-resistant directors on boards (i.e. mutual and investment funds), denoted by SENSIT 
and RESIST respectively. Board independence is also employed, showing the proportion of 
independent directors on boards and denoted by INDEP. 
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Based on prior research, we have taken into account various control variables that 
might affect corporate performance. The proportion of foreign directors (FOREIGN) on 
boards is controlled. This variable has been calculated as the ratio between the total number of 
foreign directors on boards and the total number of directors on boards (Oxelheim and 
Randoy, 2003; Choi et al., 2007). Firm size has been labelled as SIZE and has been measured 
as the log of total firm’s assets (Bachoo et al., 2013; Song, 2014). The leverage of the firm has 
also been controlled (LEV), and is measured as the quotient of debt and total assets (Erkens et 
al., 2012). We also control for ownership concentration (OWNER), CEO duality as a dummy 
variable,denoted by DUALITY (Barroso-Castro et al., 2015), and the age of the firm (AGE). 
A summary of the variables used and their calculations are provided in Table 1. 
--Insert table 1 about here-- 
The following models will be estimated in order to test our hypotheses:   
QTobinit = α + β1·Instit + β2·Indepit + β3·Foreignit + β4·Sizeit + β5·Ageit + β6·Dualityit + 
β7·Levit + β8·Ownerit + µit +εit         (1) 
QTobinit = α + β1·Sensitit + β2·Indepit + β3·Foreignit + β4·Sizeit + β5·Ageit + 
β6·Dualityit + β7·Levit + β8·Ownerit + + µit +εit    (2) 
QTobinit = α + β1·Resistit + β2·Indepit + β3·Foreignit + β4·Sizeit + β5·Ageit + 
β6·Dualityit + β7·Levit + β8·Ownerit + µit +εit    (3) 
where firm fixed and year fixed effects are represented by µit and the error by εit. The 
fixed effects of the companies take into account unobservable and constant features of the 







ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 2, we provide the main descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean value 
of Tobin’s Q ratio is 1.59. Institutional directorsaccount for 21% of the representation, while 
pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors represent, on average, 7.10% and 13.90%, 
respectively. 15.97% of the sample firms do not have institutional directors. Consistent with 
Li et al. (2006), who demonstrated the worldwide propensity to increase the presence of 
institutional directors serving on boards, this study shows that the percentage of institutional 
directors on Spanish boardrooms increased from 19.60% in 2004 to 21.70% in 2010. 
According to panel B, around 73% of companies have at least one institutional director on 
board. Independent directors represent 30% of the board sample while foreign directors 
represent only 5%. The proportion of leverage (LEV) represents 60.20% and the ownership 
concentration 30.10%. The average age of companies is 46.83 years and the firm size is 13.67 
(log of total assets expressed in thousands of euros). Finally, duality represents 33% of the 
firm observations.  
--Insert table 2 about here— 
In Table 3 we show the correlation coefficients of all the variables. Except for the 
INST-RESIST combination (which do not interact in the regressions), the coefficients report 
low values and, consequently, multicollinearity should not be considered as a concern. To 
make sure, we have also calculated the vector inflation factors (VIF’s). The values of the 
VIF’s are below 3 and, therefore, our findings are not skewed by multicollinearity (Kutner et 
al., 2005). 
--Insert table 3 about here— 
An exploratory examination was performed. In order to do so, the sample was split up 
into two groups, based on the proportion of institutional directors on boards: organisations 
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whose proportion of institutional directors is higher than the INST median comprise one 
group and companies whose proportion of institutional directors is lower than the INST 
median form the other group. The remaining variables (SENSIT, RESIST and INDEP) follow 
the same pattern. Thus, we perform an analysis of mean differences in order to examine 
whether firm value is different between both groups. Table 4 shows the results. Despite being 
inconclusive, the results show that institutional directors are connected with differences in 
corporate performance. Particularly, pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive directors, who 
represent pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive investors, respectively, have a negative 
impact on company value. Additionally, the insignificant effect of directors representing 
independent directors supports previous findings regarding the null effect of these directors on 
Spanish boards (e.g. García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 2007; Lorca et al., 2011). According 
to previous literature, the non-significant influence of independent directors may be due to a 
“real lack of independence” of these directors in Spain. 
--Insert table 4 about here— 
 
Baseline Regression Results 
Table 5 provides the estimates for the first hypothesis with the baseline model. The 
findings reporting the impact on company value of institutional directors on boards are shown 
in column 1. According to these results, the percentage of institutional directors is negatively 
associated with firm value and, consequently, the first hypothesis (H1) cannot be rejected. 
Our findings support the thesis of the passive monitoring role that institutional directors play 
with respect to the management team, given that an active monitoring role performed in firms 
where they have invested can cause conflicts of interest to arise in current or future 
commercial alliances with the firm, due to the free-rider problem, short-sighted horizons or 
because they lack the necessary skills (Bushee, 1998; Taylor, 1990). 
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--Insert table 5 about here-- 
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 5, we separate the different types of pressure-sensitive 
and pressure-resistant directors. Our results do not find a different role for sensitive 
representative directors than resistant representatives. The findings for resistant directors are 
negative and significant at 5%, in line with the hypothesis H2a. Pressure-sensitive directors 
are also negatively associated with corporate value at 10%, consistent with hypothesis H2b. 
This evidence suggests that firm value is negatively driven by both types of directors. This 
result may be justified because directors who represent resistant investors are primarily 
oriented towards stock market-based measures of performance. As a result, they may be much 
more concerned about selling the shares of an underperforming company than about investing 
time and energy in instituting a process of corporate restructuring. Additionally, pressure-
resistant directors, appointed by investors who frequently do not maintain commercial links 
with the companies where they hold shares, may find that potential commercial ties with the 
firm arise in the future (e.g. the company might wish to choose a pension fund provider for its 
employees) and, consequently, this view may also support the thesis that they could cooperate 
with managers (Van Nuys, 1993). In this line, Woidtke (2002) reported that institutional 
investors, such as public pension funds, were negatively associated with corporate 
performance. Additionally, pressure-sensitive directors maintain both commercial and 
investment ties with firms and, consequently, will align with the interests of management in 
order to avoid jeopardising the business relationship.  
The results were also confirmed for independent directors. As expected, board 
independence has no effect on corporate performance, perhaps because the directors’ “real 
independence” is called into question. Findings are in line with previous research conducted 
in Spain (García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 
2007; Lorca et al., 2011; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014) reporting that effective 
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monitoring of management is exercised by institutional board membership and not by 
independent directors. Regarding the control variables, ownership concentration (OWNER) 
and firm size (SIZE) have a negative impact on company value in the three models. The 
remaining control variables are insignificant.  
Endogeneity concerns between institutional directors (resistant and sensitive) and firm 
value have also been addressed. Thus, we wonder if institutional (sensitive and resistant) 
directors have a negative impact on company performanceor, to the contrary, companies with 
low company value attract institutional (sensitive and resistant) directors to their boards. 
Despite the greater likelihood that the causality runs from institutional (resistant and sensitive) 
directors to corporate value, it is also likely that firm performance may impact on board 
composition. This issue is approached by lagging all the independent variables (INST, 
SENSIT and RESIST), in line with Ozkan (2007), who defends that the lagging of 
explanatory variables may mitigate endogeneity concerns. In Table 6, we report the findings, 
which are in line with our main results, i.e. institutional directors (INST), and especially 
resistant directors (RESIST), are negatively and significantly related to firm performance 
(p<0.01).  
--Insert table 6 about here— 
 
Analysis Extension 
In the analysis extension, we split the sample according to the period of time. Then, 
we distinguish between the pre-crisis time period (2004-2007) and the crisis time period 
(2008-2010). This analysis is highly relevant, according to the results of Manconi et al. 
(2012), because institutional investors played a significant role in propagating the crisis. We 
assume that the short horizon of resistant institutional investors can force managers to adopt 
adverse short-term strategies that may impair future performance, especially during turbulent 
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market periods. The results from Table 7 show that when we only consider the pre-crisis  time 
period, the variables representing institutional directors (INST, RESIST and SENSIT) are not 
significant in all the different models. Concretely, institutional directors only affected 
corporate value from 2008 to 2010. These findings suggest that before the crisis these 
directors did not affect firm performance. 
On the other hand, if we look at the crisis time period, we observe that institutional 
directors contributed towards reducing the value of the firm, and if we distinguish these 
directors according to whether they are sensitive or resistant, we see that the negative effect is 
again mainly driven by those directors appointed by resistant investors (p<0.01). Therefore, 
these results suggest that pressure-resistant institutional directors affect performance 
negatively because they overvalue short-term profits potential due to their myopic 
perspective. Our results confirm the findings provided by Malconi et al (2012), who also 
suggested that during the crisis time period the pressure to sell and to meet liquidity needs 
were less serious problems for sensitive investors than for resistant investors. 
--Insert table 7 about here— 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to check the robustness of the baseline results, we ran models 1, 2 and 3 using 
the market to book ratio (MTB) (Shapiro and Li, 2016) as a dependent variable. As we see in 
Table 8, the variable institutional directors INST is significant (p<0.01) as are directors 
appointed by resistant investors RESIST (p<0.01). However, the variable representing 
sensitive directors is no longer significant, as in the baseline model, and foreign directors 
increase the performance of the company (p<0.01). Therefore, the results show that 
representatives of institutional investors have a negative impact on corporate performance, but 
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when we consider pressure-resistant directors in particular then we observe no significant 
impact. 
--Insert table 8 about here-- 
CONCLUSIONS 
Prior research reports the importance of dominant institutional investors around the 
world. Nevertheless, there is scant evidence on institutional investors performing as directors. 
We hypothesise that the motivations of institutional directors to impact on company 
performance depend on the sort of business ties between the institutional investors they 
represent and the firms. The impact on firm value of pressure-sensitive directors, 
representatives of shareholders that maintain investment and commercial relationships with 
the firm, and pressure-resistant directors, representatives of shareholders that only maintain 
commercial ties with companies, is also explored.  
Our paper shows that in contexts where investor protection is low and regulatory 
support weak, institutional directors serving on boards show a negative relationship with 
corporate performance. The findings report that pressure-sensitive institutional and pressure-
resistant institutional directors do not behave differently. Their main orientation to stock 
market-based measures of performance can justify these results and explain why directors 
with no business relationships may be much more likely to be concerned about selling the 
shares of an underperforming company than investing time and energy in instituting a process 
of restructuring the firm. Therefore, pressure-resistant institutional directors might align with 
the management team, or might become entrenched in order to attain total control of 
companies and obtain private benefits, thus impacting negatively on company performance. 
The results also suggest that an emphasis on board independence alone may not be enough to 
enhance value creation since this does not impact on firm value, confirming previous results 
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regarding the lack of significance of these directors in Spain. The results are robust to 
alternative measures of value creation. 
We also analyse whether the effect of institutional directors changed before and during 
the crisis. Our evidence demonstrates that during the crisis the negative effect of institutional 
investors only took place in the resistant group. These findings suggest that the short horizon 
of resistant institutional investors could lead managers to adopt adverse short-term strategies 
that impair performance, especially during turbulent market periods where liquidity problems 
of resistant investors were higher. 
This paper offers significant academic and political implications since it shows 
empirical evidence of how the behaviour of institutional directors, appointed by institutional 
investors, affects corporate performance, in a setting different from the Anglo-Saxon one, 
where examining the role performed by these directors becomes more complicated, given 
their low presence on boards. The findings contribute to the academic literature by showing 
that institutional investors, when acting as directors on boards, may not perform an active 
monitoring role affecting firm performance. Moreover, our results note a negative effect of 
these directors, which was even higher during the financial crisis. Accordingly, researchers 
who examine the role played by institutional investors should consider not only institutional 
investors’ shareholding, but also their involvement with other corporate governance 
mechanisms such as boards.  
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Table 1. Description and calculation of the variables  
Variable  Description 
Q TOBIN The market value of common stock plus book value of 
long term debt divided by book value of total assets. 
INST Measured by the number of institutional members on 
boards over the total number of members on boards 
SENSIT Measured by the number of pressure-sensitive members 
on boards over the total number of members on boards 
RESIST Measured by the number of pressure-resistant members 
on boards over the total number of members on boards 
INDEP Measured by the number of independent members on 
boards over the total number of members on boards 
FOREIGN Measured by the number of foreign directors on boards 
over the total number of members on boards 
LEV Measured by debt over total assets 
OWNER The ownership concentration in the firm 
DUALITY Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO also serves as chair of the 
board and 0, otherwise 
AGE The age in years of the company 
SIZE The log of total assets  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 






 Mean Std. Dev Q25 Q50 Q75 
QTOBIN 1.599 1.056 1.000 1.280 1.650 
INST 0.210 0.191 0.000 0.180 0.310 
SENSIT 0.071 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.130 
RESIST 0.139 0.182 0.000 0.090 0.200 
INDEP 0.306 0.188 0.200 0.300 0.430 
FOREIGN 0.056 0.119 0.000 0.000 0.067 
LEV 0.602 0.185 0.494 0.618 0.736 
OWNER 0.301 0.257 0.101 0.248 0.481 
AGE 46.83 28.346 24.000 40.000 66.000 
SIZE 13.67 1.931 12.244 13.504 14.868 
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Panel B. Dummies variables 
 0 % (0) 1 % (1) 
DUALITY 402 67% 198 33% 
INST_D 160 26.67% 440 73.33% 
SENSIT_D 356 59.34% 244 40.66% 
RESIST_D 264 40% 336 56% 
Q TOBIN is the proxy used for measuring corporate performance; INST shows the percentage of institutional 
members on boards; SENSIT is the percentage of pressure-sensitive directors on boards; RESIST is the 
percentage of pressure-resistant directors on boards; INST_D; SENSIT_D and RESIS_D are the dummy 
variables of institutional, sensitive and resistant directors respectively. INDEP is the proportion of 
independent directors on boards; FOREIGN is the proportion of foreign directors on boards; LEV is 
measured by debt over total assets; OWNER is the ownership concentration in the firm; DUALITY is a 
dummy coded 1 if the CEO also serves as chair of the board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total assets 




Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
  QTOBIN INST SENSIT RESIST FOREIGN INDEP LEV OWNER AGE SIZE 
QTOBIN 1          
INST -0.134** 1         
SENSIT -0.110
** 0.361** 1        
RESIST -0.074 0.830** -0.221** 1       
FOREIGN 0.129
** 0.060 -0.090* 0.117** 1      
INDEP 0.002 -0.377** -0.070 -0.352** -0.165** 1     
LEV -0.057 0.119
** -0.034 0.143** 0.050 0.025 1    
OWNER -0.064 -0.076 0.053 -0.111** 0.321** -0.103* 0.100* 1   
AGE -0.005 0.162
** -0.026 0.184** 0.041 -0.091* 0.147** -0.021 1  
SIZE -0.104* 0.106** 0.194** -0.006 0.164** 0.198** 0.442** 0.217** 0.190** 1 
            
Q TOBIN is the proxy used for measuring corporate performance; INST shows the percentage of institutional members on boards; SENSIT is the percentage of pressure-
sensitive on boards; RESIST is the percentage of pressure-resistant directors on boards; FOREIGN is the proportion of foreign directors on boards; INDEP is the proportion 
of independent directors on boards; LEV is measured by debt over total assets; OWNER is the ownership concentration in the firm; DUALITY is a dummy coded 1 if the 






Table 4. Test of means comparison 




median p-value  
INST 1.679 1.416 0.002  
SENSIT 1.622 1.458 0.047  
RESIST 1.633 1.441 0.020  
INDEP 1.590 1.525 0.441  
Q TOBIN is the proxy used for measuring corporate performance; INST shows the percentage of institutional 
members on boards; SENSIT is the percentage of pressure-sensitive directors on boards; RESIST is the 
percentage of pressure-resistant directors on boards; INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards. 












































Q TOBIN is the proxy used for measuring corporate performance; INST shows the percentage of institutional 
members on boards; SENSIT is the percentage of pressure-sensitive directors on boards; RESIST is the 
percentage of pressure-resistant directors on boards; INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards; 
FOREIGN is the proportion of foreign directors on boards; LEV is measured by debt over total assets; OWNER 
is the ownership concentration in the firm; DUALITY is a dummy coded 1 if the CEO also serves as chair of the 
board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total assets and AGE of the firm is the age in years of the company.  












                                                           (1) (2) (3) 
INST -0.787***   
 (-3.227)   
SENSIT  -0.679*  
  (-1.690)  
RESIST   -0.576** 
   (-2.262) 
INDEP -0.045 0.227 0.101 
 (-0.176) (0.958) (0.408) 
FOREIGN 1.723*** 1.608*** 1.813*** 
 (4.602) (4.207) (4.791) 
LEV 0.051 -0.055 0.093 
 (0.203) (-0.218) (0.368) 
OWNER -0.457*** -0.347** -0.439** 
 (-2.580) (-1.978) (-2.456) 
DUALITY -0.030 -0.021 -0.027 
 (-0.338) (-0.238) (-0.309) 









































Q TOBIN is the proxy used for measuring corporate performance; INST shows the percentage of institutional 
members on boards; SENSIT is the percentage of pressure-sensitive directors on boards; RESIST is the 
percentage of pressure-resistant directors on boards; INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards; 
FOREIGN is the proportion of foreign directors on boards; LEV is measured by debt over total assets; OWNER 
is the ownership concentration in the firm; DUALITY is a dummy coded 1 if the CEO also serves as chair of the 
board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total assets and AGE of the firm is the age in years of the company.  
* p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
  
                                                           (1) (2) (3) 
INST_1 -0.795***   
 (-3.179)   
SENSIT_1  -0.707  
  (-1.639)  
RESIST_1   -0.695*** 
   (-2.648) 
INDEP -0.009 0.283 0.094 
 (-0.033) (1.101) (0.361) 
FOREIGN 1.331*** 1.091*** 1.425*** 
 (3.359) (2.628) (3.570) 
LEV 0.109 0.037 0.185 
 (0.413) (0.133) (0.696) 
OWNER -0.490*** -0.422** -0.492*** 
 (-2.662) (-2.2385) (-2.650) 
DUALITY -0.022 -0.008 -0.012 















































Q TOBIN is the proxy used for measuring corporate performance; INST shows the percentage of institutional members on boards; SENSIT is the percentage of pressure-
sensitive directors on boards; RESIST is the percentage of pressure-resistant directors on boards; INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards; FOREIGN is 
the proportion of foreign directors on boards; LEV is measured by debt over total assets; OWNER is the ownership concentration in the firm; DUALITY is a dummy coded 1 
if the CEO also serves as chair of the board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total assets and AGE of the firm is the age in years of the company.* p<0.1; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01 
 Before crisis Crisis 
                                                           (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
INST -0.497   -1.133***   
 (-1.361)   (-3.698)   
SENSIT  -0.757   -0.615  
  (-1.290)   (-1.173)  
RESIST   -0.214   -1.001*** 
   (-0.564)   (-3.101) 
INDEP 0.183 0.330 0.324 -0.227 0.187 -0.063 
 (0.501) (0.989) (0.912) (-0.662) (0.567) (-0.188) 
FOREIGN 1.987*** 1.863*** 2.009*** 1.579*** 1.485*** 1.757*** 
 (3.337) (3.098) (3.346) (3.537) (3.184) (3.878) 
LEV -0.287 -0.385 -0.274 0.358 0.227 0.434 
 (-0.737) (-0.977) (-0.697) (1.174) (0.471) (1.398) 
OWNER -0.374 -0.306 -0.346 -0.599*** -0.427* -0.597** 
 (-1.453) (-1.204) (-1.335) (-2.594) (-1.838) (-2.547) 
DUALITY -0.151 -0.149 -0.149 0.116 0.137 0.117 
 (-1.172) (-1.159) (-1.153) (1.007) (1.163) (1.006) 



















































MTB is the proxy used for measuring corporate performance; INST shows the percentage of institutional 
members on boards; SENSIT is the percentage of pressure-sensitive directors on boards; RESIST is the 
percentage of pressure-resistant directors on boards; INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards; 
FOREIGN is the proportion of foreign directors on boards; LEV is measured by debt over total assets; OWNER 
is the ownership concentration in the firm; DUALITY is a dummy coded 1 if the CEO also serves as chair of the 
board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total assets and AGE of the firm is the age in years of the company. 








                                                           (1) (2) (3) 
INST -2.038***   
 (-2.746)   
SENSIT  -0.874  
  (-0.715)  
RESIST   -1.852** 
   (-2.396) 
INDEP -0.165 0.626 0.095 
 (-0.212) (0.867) (0.126) 
FOREIGN 3.596*** 3.968*** 4.420*** 
 (3.731) (3.413) (3.849) 
LEV 2.529*** 2.238*** 2.692*** 
 (3.319) (3.020) (3.494) 
OWNER -1.165** -0.895* -1.169** 
 (-2.162) (-1.676) (-2.156) 
DUALITY 0.180 0.203 0.183 
 (0.163) (0.753) (0.681) 
AGE -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-0.013) (-0.592) (-0.227) 
SIZE -0.109 -0.131 -0.148* 
 (-1.380) (-1.596) (-1.888) 
Fix effects Yes Yes Yes 
